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I offer a new approach to the old question of the epistemic value of religious experience. 
According to this approach, religious experience is a species of desire, desire in this context 
involving a kind of experience which is cognitive and unmediated. The account is inspired by 
Levinas and Heidegger, and it involves a conception of experience which is central to the 
disjunctivist account of perception. Perceptual disjunctivism is my starting-point, and it 
provides the ground for the ensuing discussion of desire. In the final section of the paper I 
argue that the parallel between perceptual disjunctivism and the Levinasian conception of 
desire points to a further strength in the account of desire here presented, namely, by 




My aim in what follows is to offer a new approach to the old question of the epistemic value 
of religious experience. The case I construct involves taking seriously the idea that religious 
experience is a species of desire.1 This does not mean that it is a form of wishful thinking, 
although such a position is forced upon us if we assume certain prevalent ways of thinking 
about desire. These approaches can be questioned, and there are good reasons for challenging 
the restrictions they impose upon the concept of desire even if our sympathies tend towards 
atheism. I defend the conception of desire articulated by Levinas and pre-empted in 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘thinking’. This conception offers an alternative to the approach which 
dominates analytic discussions, for it involves rejecting a dichotomy of reason and desire so 
as to allow that desire itself can be a mode of cognition.  
 Desire thus understood provides the central conceptual groundwork for my 
interpretation of what it could mean for there to be experience of God. So I am concerned 
with a God-involving religious experience, but although the notion of God with which I 
operate encompasses notable varieties of theism, it does not aspire to be wholly equivalent to 
the God of classical theism, and the thinkers with which I engage take issue with this 
framework in any case. Perhaps for this reason the position I defend will be of interest to 
those who prefer to tackle the issue in non-theistic terms, whether those terms be atheistic or 
apophatic - and it will bring into focus the problems to be faced when determining what it 
means for an experience to be religious.  
 Levinas takes seriously the idea that God is revealed directly at the level of desire. 
There is a question of what this means, and whether it can be defended, and I tackle these 
issues by trading upon the structure of John McDowell’s disjunctivist approach as it applies 
to sensory-experience of the physical world. 2 I am suggesting then that there is a parallel 
between the two cases which can help us to understand what it could mean for religious 
experience to be understood in these Levinasian terms. The emphasis here is upon structure 
rather than content, for there are huge and familiar disanalogies between sensory experience 
and experience of God - disanalogies which, I suggest, are better accommodated on a desire-
involving approach. So I agree with the editors of a recent collection that disjunctivism 
comes in several forms and applies to various philosophical issues. I agree also that its 
defining mark is ‘a conception of the inner and outer as suffused’,3 albeit with the caveat that 
this spatial language is not to be interpreted literally in the theistic case.4  
 McDowell says of the position that it allows us to ‘take seriously the idea of an 
unmediated openness of the experiencing subject to “external” reality’ [rather than] 
‘pictur[ing] an interface between them’.5 Talk of unmediated openness does not mean that the 
subject's cognitive or perceptual apparatus plays no role in the process. The point of denying 
‘mediation’ is simply to rule out saying that the subject's access to things is indirect, as it 
would be, for example, if there were mediating items standing between subject and object, or 
if the mind's work involved construction rather than construal.6  
 Disjunctivism involves a commitment to direct realism, and the conception of 
experience it involves - as cognitive and unmediated - is going to feed into an analogous 
conception of desire. However, it is also intended to be a defence of direct realism, and it is in 
this context that we can appreciate the point of the disjunctivist label. To return to the case of 
perception, it involves denying that there is a common conscious experience to veridical and 
non-veridical perception; instead, how things appear to someone is analysed in terms of the 
subject's being in either one or the other (hence, ‘disjunctivism’) of two distinct mental 
states, one of which (the veridical) involves reality being open or directly accessible to the 
subject, while the other (the non-veridical) does not. The relevant context here is the 
challenge to direct realism posed by hallucination when it is assumed that the same kind of 
experience occurs in both cases. It will be a final task of the paper to explore the possibility 
of a disjunctivist style response to scepticism about religious experience.  
 My approach to religious experience is different from that which has predominated in 
analytic philosophy of religion,7 for I take inspiration from the Continental philosophical 
tradition, give a key role to the concept of desire, and trade upon recent moves in the 
epistemology of perception. The ‘Continental’ dimension of my position is justified on the 
ground that I am an ‘active bridge-builder’ as far as the distinction between analytic and 
continental philosophy is concerned, ‘pursuing philosophical insights wherever they are to be 
found’ as Dan Zahavi sums up the approach.8 One such insight is to be found in the 
Levinasian conception of desire, and - active bridge-building again - the reason/desire 
dualism it calls into question has been undermined on independent grounds by various moral 
philosophers, McDowell included.9 A further reason for taking seriously the proposed model, 
and there is a knife-edge in any case between Levinas’s theism and McDowell’s moral 
realism.10  
 The concepts with which I deal elude precise definition, and a Levinasian style 
discourse seems appropriate to the religious themes at issue. This rules out knock-down 
arguments and decisive refutations, the approach instead being exploratory and open-ended. 
Analytic and Continental philosophical discourses resist combination in this sense. However, 
this does not mean that they stand irreducibly opposed, for analytic philosophy exceeds this 
narrow paradigm, and it can do so without forsaking the careful argument and scholarly 
caution which is lost when the two discourses stand dualistically opposed. It is in the spirit of 
this reconciliatory approach that the present paper is offered.  
 
2. Disjunctivism: the basics 
It is a mark of disjunctivism that inner and outer are ‘suffused’, and, as applied to veridical 
perceptual experience (henceforth perceptual experience), the claim is that it involves direct 
awareness of mind-independent, physical things. This position is opposed to one in which 
there is an interface between inner and outer, and there is an interface between the two when 
the outer is inaccessible to the inner. McDowell associates such a framework with a 'veil of 
ideas' scepticism,11 although a commitment to the relevant interface does not require the 
postulation of mental intermediaries, and the point can be expressed equally well with 
reference to an experience's representational content.12 Thus understood, the claim is that 
there is an interface between how experience represents things as being, and how they really 
are. 
McDowell seeks to defend direct realism via a form of disjunctivism, and his initial 
move is to clarify what motivates the aforementioned interface. His diagnosis is inspired by 
J.M. Hinton's work on experience,13 the starting point of the argument being that there are 
cases of hallucination where the way things appear to the subject is indiscernible from how 
they would appear if the experience were veridical – hallucinating a cat as opposed to seeing 
the real thing. So there is a similarity at the level of how things appear, and it would be 
absurd to deny this. According to the offending line of thought, however, it is concluded on 
this basis that the two experiences (the hallucinatory experience and the veridical experience) 
just are the same.14 The notion of experience is understood in terms of what the two cases 
have in common, what they have in common being how they represent things as being: they 
both represent a cat as being in front of me. So experience is relegated to the 'inner' side of 
the interface, and the difference between the veridical and non-veridical case is 
accommodated by reference to an ‘outer’, worldly, component which must be added to 
experience if it is to count as veridical.  
The decisive move is from the claim that the two experiences seem the same to the 
conclusion that they are the same, where being the same rules out the possibility of saying 
that one of these experientially indistinguishable cases provides experiential access to a mind-
independent thing. This latter way of putting the matter entitles us to say that the two 
experiences are different rather than the same, and, most significantly, that perceptual 
experience qua experience involves mind-independent things. It is in this sense that, [i]f we 
adopt the disjunctive conception of appearances, we have to take seriously the idea of an 
unmediated openness of the experiencing subject to “external” reality’.15  
McDowell is concerned with the epistemological implications of these rival 
conceptions of experience. The inference to be rejected is that 'neither of the admittedly 
indistinguishable experiences could have higher epistemic worth than that of the inferior 
case’,16 and hence, that ‘even in the best possible case, the most that perceptual experience 
can yield falls short of a subject’s having an environmental state of affairs directly available 
to her’.17 This is the conception of experience that McDowell rejects, and he spells out its 
consequences as follows: 
 
We cannot now see the inner and outer realms as interpenetrating; the correlate of this 
picture of our access to the inner is that subjectivity is confined to a tract of reality 
whose layout could be exactly as it is however things stood outside it, and the common-
sense notion of a vantage point on the external world is now fundamentally 
problematic...[our] problem is not now that our contact with the external world seems 
too shaky to count as knowledgeable, but that our picture seems to represent us as out 
of touch with the world altogether. 18 
 
To sum up: the disjunctivist denies that perceptual experience has the same epistemic 
value as that of the non-veridical case. Rather, it puts us in direct touch with mind-
independent things, and this grants us the right to say that I can know, for example, that my 
cat is on the table by virtue of seeing her there. This does not mean that my claim to 
knowledge is infallible, for I can be mistaken, when, for example, I am under the influence of 
a psychedelic drug. Such fallibility is built into the very definition of the disjunctivist 
position, the relevant disjuncts corresponding to the different kinds of experience at issue 
depending upon whether I am seeing or hallucinating: either I see a cat or my visual 
experience is misleading me in some way. So we can say that my ability to recognise cats is 
fallible, and hence, that I can be wrong in thinking that I have an experiential warrant for 
supposing that my cat is on the table. What does not follow is that I can never be so 
warranted, and the objection in effect raised by McDowell is that a proponent of the disputed 
conception of experience has a difficulty in accommodating this.19 That is to say, she has a 
difficulty making sense of the idea that we can tell something by looking. By contrast, 
disjunctivism grants us the right to say that even if there are hallucinations, and even if they 
are indistinguishable from perception, this does not show that we are cut off from the external 
world.   
What follows? Not that the problem of our knowledge of the external world has been 
put to rest: there can be no watertight refutation of the radical sceptic who insists that we are 
out of touch with the world on the basis of the undeniable fact that appearances can deceive. 
The disjunctivist is not seeking to mount an impossible proof of the external world. Rather, 
she is doing something akin to what Heidegger suggests when, in response to Kant, he says: 
 
The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of an external world] has yet to be 
given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such 
expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting 
with something of such a character that independently of it and ‘outside’ of it a ‘world’ 
is to be proved.20 
 
The point here is to question the framework which leads us to suppose that the world 
is irredeemably external to experience, and hence, that our task is the impossible one of 
explaining how we can traverse an insurmountable gap. This framework is not mandatory, 
the arguments in its favour are inconclusive, and it is certainly not required as a result of the 
fact that we can be mistaken about the nature of the state we are in.  
 
3. Introducing God 
We have a conception of experience as cognitive and unmediated, and I want now to build 
upon this approach in my discussion of what it could mean to experience God. Nobody 
seriously doubts that we are experientially open to a reality which is not of our making. By 
contrast, it seems rather less compelling to suppose that we are experientially open to God, 
for God does not appear in the world, or at least, if He does appear, then it is in a manner 
quite different from that of cats, tables, and the like.21  
 The idea that God does not appear in the world is familiar grist to the atheist’s mill: 
witness Bertrand Russell’s anticipated response to a post mortem encounter with God: ‘God, 
you gave us insufficient evidence’. Russell’s expectations in this context can be contested.22 
However, his response raises the question of what it could mean for God to appear in the 
world, if indeed it makes any sense at all. The difficulty we face here is that there is no clear 
and agreed upon sense of what it means to bring God into the equation or to leave Him out, 
although it is a common enough assumption that leaving Him out is a matter of dispensing 
with a problematic and superfluous presence which can be removed from our ontology at no 
cost. This is the response of a certain kind of atheist, and it implies that any putative 
experience of God is on a level with experiencing fairies at the bottom of the garden – the 
kind of thing one experiences when one is 'seeing things' in the hallucinatory sense.     
 Talk of hallucination calls to mind our earlier objection to the idea that experience per 
se cannot involve things because one can have the same kind of experience in the absence of 
such things. The disjunctivist responds that the fact that the two experiences seem the same 
shows at most that we can be mistaken with respect to what we are experiencing, and that this 
does not rule out saying that experience puts us in touch with mind-independent things. God's 
seeming absence from the world makes it difficult to see how one could defend the 
possibility of there being a direct experiential relation here - at least prior to an examination 
of what it could mean for God to be present. The temptation, however, is to take this 
supposed absence at face value, and conclude that there can be no experience of God. To 
revert to the terms of our previous discussion, there is an experience/God interface.  
We have yet to establish what Divine presence could mean, but it seems unlikely that 
experience of God is appropriately modelled on experience of visible things.23 This does not 
exclude the possibility of there being some kind of relation between experience of God and 
experience of visible things. The point is simply that there is a distinction between God and 
such things - which is one of the reasons why atheism attracts such widespread support. Our 
question then is what it could mean for there to be an unmediated openness to God given that 
(1) God is not present in the world in the way that physical things are present, and yet (2) 
there is a sense in which God can be said to be present nonetheless.  
 
4. Introducing desire: Heidegger and Levinas  
The question raised at the end of the previous section has preoccupied some recent 
phenomenologists who, in considering how phenomenology might be of service to theology, 
have concluded that it must be freed from the constraints which are imposed when experience 
is limited to the horizon of objectivity as determined by Husserl's constituting subject.24 
Heidegger is applauded for taking the initial, post-Husserlian, step in Being and Time, 
although it is in his later work that we find more explicit evidence of the relevant shift, for 
example, his Discourse on Thinking.25 He here introduces Eckhart's notion of Gelassenheit to 
illustrate the kind of self-surrender required for true receptivity to reality. This 'releasement' 
is said to involve a suppression of will, will being active when we think in the 
representational terms which make everything 'an object that stands opposite us within a 
horizon'.26 The opposing state of mind is described as a mode of thinking - thinking that 'is no 
longer re-presenting'27 - and it is an intrinsic feature of such thinking that it is directed 
towards and determined by something other than the thinking subject: it is 'determined solely 
by that which it is related to', and we are to suppose that there is a contrast here with ordinary, 
representational, thinking, which latter is determined as much, if not more, by the 
representing subject.28 Heidegger refers here to a 'waiting' which 'really has no object', which 
'leaves open what we are waiting for', and which involves being released  'into openness'.29 
So there is an element of passivity involved in this state of mind, for the subject 'receives' 
something outside of herself, albeit something which exceeds her powers of representation. 
However, there is activity too, for the 'mysterious region' to which she is related at this level 
of thought precipitates a movement or attraction towards itself:  we 'receive from it 
movement towards it' to be 'released to it in [our] being.30 This 'higher acting' is distinguished 
from action within the world,31 and releasement is said to involve a 'path'.32  
 It seems appropriate to describe what we have here as an unmediated openness of the 
subject to external reality, and there is a clear sense in which inner and outer are 'suffused': 
hence Heidegger's talk of the relevant reality transmitting something of itself to the subject. 
However, there are two worries at this stage. First, it is unclear how Heidegger's position 
could be remotely relevant to a subject's unmediated openness to God. After all, there is no 
mention of God in his account, and he goes out of his way here and elsewhere to distance 
himself from theism and theology.33 Second, I indicated at the start of the paper that one of 
my aims was to build up to the idea that religious experience is a species of desire, and there 
is likewise no mention made by Heidegger of desire.  
 Heidegger certainly has no time for the God of many philosophers and theologians, 
and objects to the overly theoretical approach they adopt - as if God could be reduced to 'an 
object that stands opposite us within a horizon', and as if our relation to God could be 
adequately captured in these terms. Hence his refusal to put God's name to the mysterious 
region and activity with which he is concerned. To revert to the terms of our previous 
discussion, he is seeking to clarify what it could mean to relate to something which is not 
present in the world in the way that physical things are present, yet which is present 
nonetheless. The state of mind relevant to the mysterious region of which Heidegger speaks 
is said to involve movement and attraction - from its source to the subject and back again. 
What this seems to mean, when taken in conjunction with the previous point, is that we are 
attracted to something which exceeds our powers of representation - something revealed to us 
through this attractive pull.  
 Heidegger distinguishes such activity from action within the world, and we could be 
forgiven for thinking that this 'higher' activity is sealed off from the world - the world 
including beings like ourselves who, according to this picture, are purely will-driven. 
Heidegger makes clear here and elsewhere that he stands opposed to this dualistic 
framework.34 We are to suppose then that we ourselves are receptive to the relevant pull, and 
that the limits of worldly activity are transformed accordingly. This openness is said to bring 
a suppression of self-will, and although it is tempting to suppose that the self is obliterated 
here by a superior force, it is compatible with what has been said that it comes to 
acknowledge and to accept the relevant pull and to be transformed in the process. Heidegger's 
reference to a path or a way captures the dynamic and open-ended nature of the journey this 
attraction calls forth, although its overall shape is left unclear, as is the nature of the authority 
it exerts.    
 The word 'desire' is absent from this account, and seemingly irrelevant to an 
understanding of the state of mind at issue if it is assumed that desire is a non-cognitive state 
which is simply about wanting to get things for oneself. These assumptions can be contested, 
and it will be a task of the following sections to make that good. We can begin to get a sense 
of the relevant dialectic by turning to Levinas. Levinas agrees with Heidegger that we must 
move beyond the limits of self-will if we are to appreciate all that there is. He grants also that 
there is a level of cognition which is non-representational, which relates the subject to 
something external,35 and which involves movement and attraction from its source to the 
subject and back again. It involves 'an aspiration that the Desirable animates; it originates 
from its "object"; it is revelation'. This aspiration is described by Levinas as a mode of desire, 
and the dimension of reality it reveals is 'the infinite':  
 
The idea of the infinite, in which being overflows idea, in which the Other overflows 
the Same, breaks with the inward play of the soul and alone deserves the name 
experience, a relationship with the exterior. It is then more cognitive than cognition 
itself. 36 
 
The infinite is not the object of a contemplation, that is, is not proportionate to the 
thought that thinks it. The idea of the infinite is a thought which at every moment thinks 
more than it thinks. A thought that thinks more than it thinks is Desire. Desire 
'measures' the infinity of the infinite.37    
 
 The general idea is familiar: we have a state of mind which is cognitive in the sense 
that it involves being open to external reality - 'being overflows idea' to 'break [] with the 
inward play of the soul' -  and the claim that it is more cognitive than cognition itself gives 
expression to the complaint that ordinary cognition involves distortion. It is for this reason 
that the mode of cognition under present consideration 'alone deserves the name experience'. 
Levinas also describes it as a species of desire, and offers his own version of Heidegger's 
distinction between self-interested activity and activity appropriate to the state of mind at 
issue, distinguishing between need and desire to this end. Need has its origin in the subject, it 
is self-interested, and it is all about wanting things for oneself. Desire, by contrast, has its 
origin in something beyond the subject, and it involves being attracted to something 
independently desirable.   
 Levinas leaves us in no doubt about the theistic significance of such desire, although 
he makes clear that its source and object must elude our attempts to comprehend it - 'it is not 
the object of a contemplation'. He insists, however, that we relate to it authentically at the 
level of desire, and it is in this context that he tells us that '[t]he infinite is not "in front of 
me''; It is I who express it'.38 I am said to express the infinite in my moral interactions with 
others, and it is in so interacting that I give expression to my desire for God - this desire 
which God animates. Levinas agrees with Heidegger that the subject is embarked upon a path 
in this context. However, he parts company with him by insisting that this path is to be found 
only in our moral interactions with others, and that it is at this level that we can aspire to a 
knowledge of God. Hence: 'everything I know of God and everything I can hear of His word 
and reasonably say to Him must find an ethical expression'.39  
 
5. Desire: some clarifications 
I shall return to the question of whether this detour through ethics compromises the idea that 
our openness to God is unmediated. First though, I want to bring out the implications of our 
discussion for an understanding of the nature of desire and its relation to experience. We 
began with a (disjunctivist) model of what it could mean for experience to be cognitive and 
unmediated, and this led to the question of whether such a model could be appropriate to the 
case of experience of God given that (1) God is not present in the world in the way that 
physical things are present, and (2) there is a sense in which God is present nonetheless. 
Heidegger and Levinas postulate a state of mind which takes us beyond the perception of 
physical things, but which involves being open to external reality. Levinas describes its 
object in theistic terms, even whilst denying that it is something we could properly 
comprehend. Indeed, he goes so far as to deny that the infinite 'is in front of me', echoing 
Heidegger's talk of a state of mind 'which has no object'. He claims also that this state of 
mind is a mode of experience, cognition, and desire. I want to suggest that, properly 
understood, what we have here is an account of desire as a kind of experience which is 
cognitive and unmediated.  
 The idea that it is a mode of experience captures the sense in which the subject is 
open to something in external reality - it breaks with 'the inward play of the soul' in this 
respect, and counts equally as a mode of cognition for this reason. The contrast here is with 
ordinary experience and cognition - which remain irredeemably 'inner' we are to suppose. It is 
a familiar enough thought - in the analytic tradition at least - that cognition aims at truth, and 
that it is to be distinguished from desire in this respect, which latter aims at the realisation of 
whatever outcome serves to satisfy it (I want to finish this paper, drink this wine, unite with 
my beloved). As far as the link with cognition and truth is concerned, it will be remembered 
that we are talking about a conception of cognition which exceeds our ordinary understanding 
thereof, and although the limits of the supposedly 'ordinary' can be debated and contested, it 
is not ruled out that, in this new context, the link between cognition and truth is broken, or 
alternatively, that it is preserved, albeit in a manner which is compatible with the idea that we 
are concerned equally with a mode of desire. This is Levinas's position, and it involves 
treating desire as involving an attraction to something independently desirable - something 
which elicits the desire and draws us towards itself. On this way of thinking, God is 
metaphysically necessary for desire, or to put it in contemporary philosophical jargon, desire 
is to be comprehended in externalist terms - 'externalist' in the sense that it is individuated 
with reference to its object (compare the disjunctivist's externalist conception of experience).  
  This externalist conception of desire makes no sense if desire is to be comprehended 
in the aforementioned non-cognitivist terms. According to this (neo-Humean) model, 
cognition ranges over what there is, it has nothing to do with being attracted to things, and 
attraction comes into the picture only at the level of will or desire. Desire has nothing to do 
with cognition because it has nothing to do with tracking what there is, there being nothing in 
the world which is intrinsically attractive or desirable. The desirable is determined rather by 
our desires, and more specifically, by whatever has the potential to satisfy them.40  
 Heidegger has this picture in mind when he complains that 'thinking in values [in this 
sense] involves the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being',41 and it can be contested. It 
can be contested because although there are desires which seem to conform to this paradigm, 
it has not been shown that it is exhaustive, and it is certainly not established with the claim 
that the world is motivationally inert (question-begging) or that value has its origin in us 
(ditto).42 Such criticisms have surfaced in analytic philosophy, giving further credence to the 
proposed remodelling of desire.43 Nevertheless, the disputed picture has captivated 
philosophers and others, and the prevailing treatment of desire is compatible with it. 
According to this treatment, there are appetitive desires which we share with other animals, 
and our non-appetitive desires are to be understood as propositional attitudes, namely, that of 
wanting the proposition which specifies the content of the desire to be true (I want that I 
finish this paper).44  
 Clearly, there are desires which fall into these categories - after all, I want nothing 
more than that I finish this paper, and I was pretty hungry an hour ago. However, the state of 
mind with which we are concerned is not an appetitive desire, and it is not easy to see how it 
could be comprehended in propositional terms. For a start, its object cannot be identified and 
pinned down, and it is not in any case a matter of wanting some proposition to be true. Talbot 
Brewer has challenged the propositional account on precisely these lines, arguing likewise 
that there are desires it fails to accommodate.45 He takes it to go hand in hand with a crude 
naturalistic vision in which human agency is reduced to a throwing around of our causal 
weight in response to the desires we seek to satisfy - I want that I finish this paper, go for a 
swim, get drunk, make the world in my own image. We are returned to 'thinking in values' in 
Heidegger's pejorative sense.  
 Brewer's objection to this conception of human agency is that it leaves no room for 
the ideals and values which orientate our projects, and our ongoing attraction to which gives 
our lives a unity and narrative as we struggle to bring these values into view and to embody 
them. This talk of attraction is familiar, and Brewer describes it likewise as a species of desire 
- one whose content involves 'an inchoate picture of some species or aspect of goodness'.46 
He takes such desire to be presupposed in our more 'production-oriented' desires, and that 
without which they would be unintelligible.47 The further claim - implicit in the idea that we 
are embarked upon a path in this context - is that desire thus understood is to be 
comprehended in dynamic terms. Thus understood, it is the ever-present and unifying 
backdrop to our lives and projects as they unfold in their various ways. Brewer traces  
this approach back to the Platonist, Neo-Platonist, and Christian mystical tradition - a 
tradition in which 'the human encounter with Goodness or God is not a passionless 
intellectual exercise but rather the responsiveness of reason to something that mightily 
attracts it'.48  
 It is familiar from Heidegger and (more explicitly) Levinas that desire takes the 
subject outside of herself - the movement is 'ecstatic' in this sense - and this leads Brewer to 
expose a further defect of the propositional account. This is what he says in the context of 
discussing the position of the fourth century Platonist Gregory of Nyssa: 
 
If the love of the Good, or of God, is mistaken for the desire that one be good, or 
possess the good, or be worthy of the love of God, this would be tantamount to 
reversing the 'direction of gaze' of the desire. What presents itself as an attraction to 
something other, longing for which might have the indirect effect on the desirer of 
making the desirer good, is misconstrued as a desire for its own indirect effect. This 
cannot be the desire in question, since one could have any one of these self-oriented 
propositional desires (i.e. that one be good, or possess the good, or be worthy of the 
love of God) without feeling the overwhelming and unmediated attraction to the good, 
or God, that Gregory is trying to characterise.49  
 
6. Religious experience 
We have a conception of desire which calls into question some existing paradigms and 
assumptions and which deserves to be taken seriously. The positions used to illustrate this 
conception can be distinguished, and we are in a position now to clarify those distinctions in 
the context of tackling head on the questions which have been beckoning, namely, what is the 
nature of relation between desire thus understood and experience? What does it mean to 
describe this experience as religious? And in what sense, if any, is it unmediated?  
 Levinas uses the term 'experience' to capture the idea that the relevant state of mind 
involves being open to something in external reality, and he uses the term 'cognition' to 
similar effect. This is perfectly reasonable, although there is a question of how this spatial 
language is to be interpreted.50 The relation between experience and desire seems more 
complex. After all, we are not used to thinking of desire as a cognitive or an experiential 
state, schooled as we are on the assumption that it stands opposed to such things. This 
assumption has been questioned, but it lurks in what seems to be an obvious objection to the 
position at hand, namely, that the correct way of comprehending the relation between 
experience and desire is to say that desire is a consequence of the experience, when, for 
example, my attraction to goodness makes me want to do good things.51 It is certainly true 
that I can be motivated in this manner, but the objection involves a failure to distinguish 
between the desires which are operative in this latter context, and those expressed when we 
feel the relevant attraction. On the position at issue, feeling the relevant attraction is just what 
it is to have the desire - one whose content involves this kind of attraction, and which can 
motivate other desires, like, for example, the desire to be a virtuous person. This is not to 
deny - as per the above quotation - that this latter desire can exist without such attraction, and 
it makes sense to suppose also that the motivation can go in the other direction - that wanting 
to be virtuous can augment a desire-involving attraction to the good.52  
 Heidegger's account mentions neither morality nor God, but his inspiration is the 
Gott-betrunken Eckhart, he insists that we are on a pilgrimage here, and his antipathy to 
'thinking in values' is determined to a large extent by the crude instrumentalist framework he 
associates with it. Should a properly religious experience be articulated with reference to 
God? Perhaps not. Should it involve God? The conditions for involvement are unclear. 
Should it involve morality? The connection between God and good seems clear, but it seems 
contentious to say that religious experience is reducible to moral experience, or indeed, that I 
can relate to God only by standing in moral relations to others.  
 When Levinas makes this latter claim it is in the context of denying that the infinite is 
'in front of me' so as to allow instead that 'it is I who express it'. His point here is that the 
infinite - i.e. God - cannot be reduced to a represented object, and that engaging with God 
requires that one partakes in His goodness. What of the 'overwhelming and unmediated 
attraction to the good' which is so important to Brewer's account? Is Levinas discounting such 
experience? And what are we to make of Anselm Min's insistence that, for Levinas, '[t]here is 
no unmediated, direct access to the Good', that 'we can move to the Good only by going 
through the movement to the other'?53  
 Our openness to God would be mediated in a sense which precludes openness if there 
were some mediating item between self and God which imposes an insurmountable gap 
between the two (compare the claim that ideas or sense-data mediate our experience of 
things), or if our mode of relating to God - in this case, desire - involved distortion rather than 
revelation. Mediation in these senses is not to be confused with the kind which is compatible 
with openness, and indeed, a condition upon its possibility (compare: a perceptual apparatus 
is that without which we would be unable to perceive things). Understood in this latter way, 
mediation offers a route to God, and according to the position at hand, this route is to be 
found at the level of desire, desire being that which reveals God and which moves us towards 
Him. On this picture then, God is what we desire, and God is expressed in our desire - 'it is I 
who express [the infinite]'.   
 If God is expressed in our desire, and we are capable of partaking in this movement, 
then we are open to Him in this respect, and our attraction counts as unmediated in this sense. 
Now it is fundamental to Levinas's account that there is a distinction between self and God, 
the first of these terms guaranteeing that we do God's work, and the second that the desire in 
which we partake is infinite and hence, inexhaustible. So attraction is mediated to this degree 
at least, and given that God cannot be represented to ourselves, then it cannot be modelled on 
attraction to such an object. Rather, the appropriate model is the desire-involving trajectory in 
which we are caught up - one which turns us in a moral direction given that the desire at issue 
here is God's self-giving and outpouring love. On this way of thinking then, I am only truly 
attracted to God when I am caught up in this movement. It is in this context that I 'express the 
infinite'.  
 It would be absurd to say that being good to others imposes an interface between self 
and goodness, and it is therefore unclear what we are to make of Min's claim that our relation 
to Good is indirect if we can move to it 'only by going through the movement to the other'. 
But what of our relation to God? It is a familiar enough thought that God is veiled from our 
sight, and it would be an obvious extension of this idea that we can relate to Him only 
indirectly, e.g. through our moral relations with others. But if God just is the movement 
which directs us towards the other, then it makes no sense to say that our relation to Him in 
this context is indirect. It would be like saying that our relation to necessity is indirect 
because it involves reference to causally related objects. Does this not compromise the idea 
that God is veiled from our sight? Well the emphasis here could be that God is veiled from 
our sight, taking us beyond a sensory perceptual model. Alternatively, it could be a way of 
insisting that revelation and hiddenness are inseparable in our encounter with God, and 
hence, that the relevant apophatic dimension must be accommodated from within the very 
experience of desire.54 This does not mean that God's real essence transcends the life of 
desire, but it does allow us to say that, even at this level of interaction, there are limits, one 
fundamental limit coming from the fact that we are distinct from God, and human all too 
human in one clear enough sense - 'my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways 
my ways' (Isaiah 55:8).  
 
7. Disjunctivism, again 
I have presented a model in terms of which to comprehend what it could mean for a subject to 
stand in an unmediated experiential relation to God, given that God is not present in the 
world in the way that physical things are present, and given that there is a sense in which He 
is present nonetheless. Thus understood, God is experienced in desire, desire involving an 
attraction which has its source in God and which sets the subject on a journey towards Him. I 
have noted that Levinas lends emphasis to the moral dimension of this journey, and he is 
adamant that this is the only way of giving authentic expression to such desire.  
 The atheist has ample room for rejecting such an account given the nature of the case. 
So, for example, he can deny that there is any such thing as desire thus understood, lending 
justice to this denial by noting that there are disagreements about its nature, and that its 
supposedly theistic dimension can be disputed. According to the most extreme version of this 
response, desire is wholly and adequately comprehended in appetitive and/or propositional 
terms. Alternatively, and more plausibly, the atheist can concede that there is more to desire 
than this, whilst denying that it has anything to do with God. This is one way of interpreting 
Heidegger's position, although his real target seems to be a certain kind of theology, and, 
more generally, any approach which stands in the way of what is truly valuable. The position 
of the secular moral realist can be similarly interpreted, albeit minus the mystical overtones 
which pervade Heidegger's account, and with a greater attunement to Levinas given the focus 
upon morality.55   
 The obvious reason for denying that desire has anything to do with God is that God is 
not a clearly identifiable ingredient in desire, but the theist's familiar response is that any such 
ingredient would not be God. The sensible atheist will concede this point. He can insist, 
however, that there is nothing within the trajectory of desire which invites or demands a 
theistic interpretation, and that what really matters, namely, our attraction to value, can be 
described in entirely non-theistic terms. The assumption here is that God is irrelevant to 
desire, and hence, that there is a desire/God interface.  
 Such a putative response by the atheist is reminiscent of the experience/world 
interface which is presupposed by one who resists direct realism in a perceptual context, and I 
want now to return to the parallel I have sought to defend and push it even further by 
suggesting the possibility of a disjunctivist style response to scepticism about religious 
experience. We have seen that there is a question to be raised about what motivates the 
imposition of an interface between experience and world, and whether it is justified. The 
point in its favour is that there are hallucinations which are subjectively indiscernible from 
veridical experience, and it is concluded on this basis that there is no difference between the 
two cases, and hence, that there is no more to experience than what we have at the level of 
hallucination. But the direct realist denies that it follows from this that the two experiences 
are the same, and defends this stance by offering a disjunctivist analysis of the relevant 
difference - one which grants us the right to deny that there is an experience/world interface.  
 Now given that God is conspicuous by His absence in one clear enough sense, it is 
easy enough to say of any desire which purports to involve Him that it seems no different 
from one that does not, and to conclude on this basis that it does not involve God. This is the 
decisive move, and it is analogous to that which is made by one who trades upon the case of 
hallucination to conclude that experience does not involve things. That is to say that in both 
cases we have a state of mind which is supposedly compatible with openness, whilst also 
appearing to be indiscernible from one which is not. Direct realism in a theistic context grants 
us the right to say that desire can be God-involving, and the essence of a disjunctive strategy 
here is to challenge the sceptic’s reasoning from indistinguishability between a veridical and 
non-veridical experience of God to a denial that any experience of God is real.  
It is granted therefore that desire can be God-involving, and that God's presence can seem 
like a form of absence. The justification for permitting such a move here is that God is not 
present in the manner of ordinary things.  
 Does it follow that there is unmediated openness to God? Of course not if this is 
tantamount to saying that God’s existence has been established. What we can say, however, 
is that there is a case for saying that such openness exists at the level of desire, and that the 
atheist’s objections in this context are open to question. I leave for another occasion the 
further important questions which can and should be addressed to this interpretation.56 
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